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Most Americans want the Congress to act to right a wrong that has 
persisted for too long. The hypocrisy in which all of us have had a part 
has had a corrosive effect on the national conscience. Discrimination is 
debasing, not just to those discriminated against but to those who 
discriminate. 
— Civil Rights – Public Accommodations: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 619-20 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clifford P. 
Case, New Jersey) 
 
My people, who have elected me to represent their views, say that they do 
not believe in this kind of law; they believe, as I do, that we cannot 
legislate morality or reason, and we cannot eliminate by injunction the 
conflicts of human nature. 
— Civil Rights Act of 1964: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on 
Rules, 88th Cong. 563 (1964) (statement of Rep. Gillis W. Long, Louisiana) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines arguments made in debates about the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (the “CRA”) as to whether Congress could or should “legislate 
morality” by passing a broad federal civil rights bill. It also looks at how 
invocations of “conscience” featured in those debates—particularly the 
argument that the national conscience demanded such a law because 
discrimination posed a moral crisis. Proponents and opponents of the CRA 
differed sharply on the role of federal law in addressing prejudice and 
discrimination, but even proponents recognized the limits of what law could 
achieve. While proponents of the CRA viewed it as removing artificial barriers 
created by segregation that constrained normal or natural human interaction, 
opponents defended segregation as natural and warned that the CRA would 
usher in a dangerous and forced racial intermingling and line-crossing. This 
Article highlights arguments made in the context of the public 
accommodations and employment provisions of the CRA, but also draws on 
rhetoric about education, where opponents’ appeals to the consequences of 
racial intermingling—including intermarriage—indicate continuing resistance 
to Brown v. Board of Education’s indictment of “separate but equal” in 
education. 
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A. Bigotry, Conscience, and Controversies over Marriage 
This Article is part of a larger project examining the rhetoric of bigotry and 
conscience in historical and present-day controversies over civil and 
constitutional rights.1 One motivation for that larger project was the sharp 
criticism made by the dissenters in United States v. Windsor,2 in which the 
Supreme Court found part of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) 
unconstitutional. The dissenting opinions contended that the majority was 
tarring “the political branches with the brush of bigotry”3 and casting 
supporters of the one man-one woman definition of marriage as “members of a 
wild-eyed lynch mob” with “hateful hearts.”4 Further, the dissenters argued 
that to compare race and sex discrimination with defending traditional or 
“conjugal” marriage would “cast all those who cling to traditional beliefs about 
the nature of marriage in the role of bigots or superstitious fools.”5 Prominent 
opponents of same-sex marriage quickly enlisted the dissenters’ rhetoric to 
relate Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion to a “larger cultural dynamic” in 
which those working to “redefine marriage” threatened opponents with the 
“stigma of being ‘haters’ and ‘bigots,’” and “the equivalent of a racist.”6 This 
rhetoric invites the question whether the terms “bigot” or “bigotry,” for 
example, have any meaningful content, or whether they function simply as 
invectives or conversation-stoppers. 
A second motivation for my larger project is that present-day controversies 
over the evident clash between religious liberty and state antidiscrimination 
laws, in an era of growing marriage equality for same-sex couples, often 
invoke the CRA. Opponents of same-sex marriage strenuously object to any 
analogy between opposing same-sex marriage and opposing interracial 
marriage, and they warn that religious conservatives are at risk of losing their 
religious liberty if the conflation of conscientious objection with bigotry goes 
unaddressed.7 Supporters of broad, religious, conscience-based exemptions for 
 
1 See Linda C. McClain, Marriage, Conscience, and Bigotry (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
2 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
3 Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
4 Id. at 2707-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
5 Id. at 2717-18 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
6 Ryan T. Anderson, Civility, Bullying, and Same-Sex Marriage, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
(July 15, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/7/civility-bullying-and-
same-sex-marriage, archived at http://perma.cc/WWX9-DYD3. 
7 Rod Dreher, Does Faith = Hate?, AMER. CONSERVATIVE, Sept.-Oct. 2013, at 12, 14-15 
(quoting Ryan Anderson); see also Anderson, supra note 6. Ryan Anderson is a Fellow at 
the Heritage Foundation and regularly writes essays and friend of the court briefs defending 
the one man-one woman definition of marriage and the religious liberty of supporters of that 
definition. In Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718-19 (Alito, J., dissenting), Justice Alito cited, as an 
illustration of the “conjugal model” of marriage, Anderson’s coauthored book, WHAT IS 
MARRIAGE: MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012) (with Sherif Girgis and Robert George). 
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nonprofit religious organizations as well as for religious people operating for-
profit businesses argue that such exemptions from providing goods and 
services to same-sex couples are appropriate in a way that invocations of 
conscience in the context of race discrimination are not.8 Alternatively, they 
may argue9 that whether or not objections to same-sex marriage seem—as 
public opinion about same-sex marriage evolves—to be a form of bigotry, 
broad exemptions that “advance important civil rights for proponents and 
opponents [of same-sex marriage] alike,” are akin to the “Mrs. Murphy” 
exemptions in the CRA that enabled its passage.10 Conversely, when Arizona 
(a state with, at that time, neither marriage equality nor an antidiscrimination 
law that included sexual orientation) prophylactically passed a law—vetoed by 
Governor Jan Brewer—to provide exemptions to businesses, Governor Frank 
Keating of Oklahoma insisted that “[t]his isn’t 1964 anymore,” and that “[i]f 
you open up your doors to the general public, you can’t pick and choose who 
you are going to deal with.”11 
To date, my historical research on bigotry and conscience has focused 
primarily on the context of marriage, particularly “mixed” marriage. I have 
examined how people applied concepts of bigotry and conscience either in 
defending objections to—and legal restrictions on—interracial marriage or in 
defending interracial marriage and attacking bans on it. I have also looked at 
the use of such rhetoric in discussions of interfaith marriage. Scholars 
defending religious liberty today often distinguish conscience-based objections 
to same-sex marriage as entirely different from earlier objections to interracial 
marriage. Nonetheless, opponents of interracial marriage resisted the label of 
“bigot” and appealed to conscience, morality, religious teaching, and the Bible 
 
8 Robin Fretwell Wilson argues: “The religious and moral convictions that motivate 
objections to refuse to facilitate same-sex marriage simply cannot be marshalled to justify 
racial discrimination.” Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-
Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 101 (Douglas Laycock Jr. ed., 2008). Wilson is a co-author 
of a standard letter sent by several law professors to governors and legislators urging robust 
“religious conscience protection” in any marriage equality bill. On the issue of whether that 
protection would extend to “permit objections to interracial marriage,” the letter states, 
“Although such objections are likely to be rare, if not non-existent, this concern is readily 
addressed by a simple proviso that would” clarify that “this section does not change any 
provision of law with respect to discrimination on the basis of race.” Letter from Professor 
Wilson et al., to Governor Pat Quinn, Illinois (Dec. 18, 2012), available at 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-
and-samesex-marriage.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2NK2-JYUK. 
9 Robin Fretwell Wilson offers such an argument in this volume. See generally Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, Bargaining for Civil Rights: Lessons from Mrs. Murphy for Same-Sex 
Marriage and LGBT Rights, 95 B.U. L. REV. 951. 
10 Id. 
11 Adam Nagourney, Arizona Bill Stirred Alarm in the G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 
2014, at A11. 
  
2015] LEGISLATING MORALITY 895 
 
as bases for their stance.12 This appeal raises the question of whether a position 
presented as one of conscience could nonetheless be bigoted. On the other side, 
speeches and sermons by civil rights supporters contrast conscience and 
bigotry and condemn the fixation upon interracial marriage by opponents of 
integration.13 I have found that some objections to interracial marriage were 
part of a broader objection to intermarriage, including interfaith marriage. 
Opponents of such marriages argued that to characterize their opposition as 
rooted in prejudice was itself a form of prejudice.14 Interracial and interfaith 
marriages, on this view, were “problem marriages” because of their impact on 
the married couple, their children, their families, and society. Thus, in my 
larger project, I have looked extensively at the interplay of bigotry and 
conscience in the context of arguments both against and in support of forms of 
marriage: interracial, interfaith, and same-sex. One connection between 
intermarriage, or “mixed” marriage, and antidiscrimination law is that 
historical analyses of why more young people were more willing to cross 
racial, ethnic, religious, and economic lines to marry observed that they had 
more opportunity for social contact across these lines in schools, workplaces, 
and social settings (including fraternities, sororities, and social clubs).15 While 
some obstacles to such line-crossing were cultural and social, some were also 
legal. Thus, by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, 
religion, or (in Title VII) sex in various spheres of society, the CRA made it 
easier for people to interact on terms of social equality. 
 
12 For example, as I discuss in Marriage, Conscience, and Bigotry, segregationists 
rejected the characterization of their opposition to integration in education and to the 
intermarriage they believed would ensue as reflecting “bigotry” or “race prejudice,” and 
countered that they were “waging a fight of morality and conscience.” McClain, supra note 
1, at 78-79 (quoting Hon. John Bell Williams of Mississippi, Address at the Defenders of 
State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, Extension of Remarks of Hon. William M. Tuck, 
CONG. REC. 4339 (1957)). See generally FAY BOTHAM, ALMIGHTY GOD CREATED THE 
RACES: CHRISTIANITY, INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE, AND AMERICAN LAW 131-57 (2009) 
(explaining the role of “Southern white Protestant theology of race” in creating and 
defending antimiscegenation laws).  
13 Many examples are available in the outstanding collection RHETORIC, RELIGION AND 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1954-1965 (Davis W. Houck & David E. Dixon eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter RHETORIC, RELIGION]. One striking example in the collection is Dr. Haywood 
N. Hill, This I Believe, a speech given at Trinity Presbyterian Church, Atlanta, Georgia, in 
January 1961, in which the speaker states: “I must live by conviction and by conscience 
rather than by preference and by prejudice,” even though it “entails the risk of 
intermarriage.” Dr. Haywood N. Hill, Address at Trinity Presbyterian Church (Jan. 1961), in 
RHETORIC, RELIGION, supra, at 405, 406-07. For more examples, see McClain, supra note 1, 
at 81-90. 
14 E.g., ALBERT I. GORDON, INTERMARRIAGE: INTERFAITH, INTERRACIAL, INTERETHNIC 
358 (1964). 
15 Id. at 54-55. 
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B. The Scientific Study of Prejudice and the Argument that “Stateways 
Cannot Change Folkways” 
To address the questions of whether the terms “bigot” or “bigotry” have any 
real meaning and how they have related to arguments about “conscience” in 
matters of civil rights, I have looked at the study of prejudice by prominent 
social scientists from the post-World War II period of the late 1940s through 
the early 1960s.16 In 1954, in the preface to his influential book, The Nature of 
Prejudice, Gordon W. Allport, Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, 
reported “the impulse”—since the end of World War II—to engage in 
scientific study to understand conflict and “the roots of prejudice” and find 
“concrete means for implementing men’s affiliative values,” that is, “hate free 
values.”17 He observed: “[U]niversities in many lands have given new 
prominence to this approach under various academic names: social science, 
human development, social psychology, human relations, social relations.”18 
So, too, a variety of organizations—often in partnership with universities—
dedicated to protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of minority groups 
turned their attention to the “science” of social relations, as book titles from 
that era indicate.19  
That literature spurred my interest in examining arguments about whether 
Congress, by enacting the CRA, could or should “legislate morality.” In The 
Nature of Prejudice, Allport challenged the famous assertion of distinguished 
nineteenth-century sociologist William Graham Sumner that “stateways cannot 
change folkways,” and its modern counterparts, “you cannot legislate against 
 
16 I have a longer discussion of this literature in my draft paper, “Marriage, Conscience, 
and Bigotry,” and just mention a few themes here. See McClain, supra note 1, at 49-74. 
17 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE, at xiv (1954).  
18 Id. Allport was affiliated with Harvard’s Department of Social Relations. Id. at xviii. 
19 For example, Max Horkheimer and Samuel H. Flowerman, co-editors of the Studies in 
Prejudice book series and directors of the newly-created Department of Scientific Research 
of the American Jewish Committee (“AJC”) argued that “prejudice” was a “social disease,” 
which social scientists could study to “search for more effective ways to prevent or reduce 
the virulence of the next outbreak.” Max Horkheimer & Samuel H. Flowerman, Foreword 
to Studies in Prejudice, in BRUNO BETTELHEIM AND MORRIS JANOWITZ, DYNAMICS OF 
PREJUDICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF VETERANS, at vii (1950). “An 
aroused conscience” about the recent “mechanized persecution and extermination of 
millions of human beings” was “not enough,” they argued, “if it does not stimulate a 
systematic search for an answer” to how it could have happened. Id. The AJC funded the 
Studies in Prejudice book series and brought together scholars to study and seek solutions to 
religious and racial prejudice. The series included the classic book, T.W. ADORNO ET AL., 
THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950). See also GERHART SAENGER, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE: ACHIEVING INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING IN A DEMOCRACY 
(1953). Allport acknowledges financial support from the Commission on Community 
Interrelations of the American Jewish Congress, the National Conference of Christians and 
Jews, and the Moses Kimball Fund of Boston. ALLPORT, supra note 17, at xviii. 
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prejudice” or “you cannot legislate morality.”20 Plessy v. Ferguson,21 Allport 
pointed out, similarly reflected the premise that “law was powerless to counter 
‘racial instincts.’”22 Writing a decade before the passage of the CRA, Allport 
considered the enactment of broad federal civil rights legislation unlikely for 
the foreseeable future, “unless the Senate rules are amended to control 
filibusters.”23 Nonetheless, in a chapter entitled, “Ought There to be a Law?,” 
Allport pointed to experience with existing antidiscrimination laws, including 
state and municipal versions of the World War II-era Fair Employment 
Practices Committee (“FEPC”)24 and housing laws, to argue that contact on 
terms of social equality can diminish prejudice and that legislation can bring 
about that contact.25 To put this reference to social contact on terms of equality 
in context, one tool used to measure prejudice was the “social distance” scale 
that asked people if members of various ethnic, racial, and religious groups 
were acceptable as co-workers, neighbors, friends, kin, and marital partners.26 
Allport also countered the “you cannot legislate against prejudice” argument 
by asserting that most Americans “deep inside their consciences do approve 
civil rights and antidiscrimination legislation.”27 In support, Allport and other 
social scientists drew on Gunnar Myrdal’s influential “characterization of the 
American Dilemma”: “Each American is susceptible to sharp conflict when his 
prejudices clash with his American Creed.”28 Myrdal argued that this “ever-
raging conflict” was “the moral dilemma” at the heart of the “problem” of the 
status of African Americans in the United States.29 In examining the roots of 
 
20 See ALLPORT, supra note 17, at 469 (discussing Sumner’s assertion and its modern 
counterpart). For a helpful discussion, see Elliot Aronson, Stateways Can Change Folkways, 
reprinted in HATRED, BIGOTRY, AND PREJUDICE: DEFINITIONS, CAUSES & SOLUTIONS 227 
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1999). 
21 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
22 ALLPORT, supra note 17, at 469. 
23 Id. at 463.  
24 See infra Part II.D for discussion of the FEPC. 
25 ALLPORT, supra note 17, at 463-64. 
26 Id. at 38-39 (discussing the work of E.S. BOGARDUS, IMMIGRATION AND RACE 
ATTITUDES (1928)); see also Bernard M. Kramer, Dimensions of Prejudice, 27 J. PSYCHOL. 
389, 389 (1949). 
27 ALLPORT, supra note 17, at 472. 
28 Gordon W. Allport & Bernard M. Kramer, Some Roots of Prejudice, 22 J. PSYCHOL. 9, 
33 (1946) (citing GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1944)); see also ALLPORT, supra note 17, at 329-30 (in chapter on 
“Inner Conflict,” reporting and enlisting Myrdal’s theory that “the crux of the whole issue is 
the inner ‘moral uneasiness’ white Americans suffer at failing to make their practice 
conform to the American creed” (citing MYRDAL, supra)).  
29 MYRDAL, supra note 28, at xlix. Myrdal emphasizes this moral dimension in the 
introduction to his book: 
Though our study includes economic, social, and political race relations, at bottom our 
problem is the moral dilemma of the American—the conflict between his moral 
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bigotry and prejudice, Allport and colleagues identified a “lack of insight”—or 
the absence of any conscious discomfort about this clash—as characteristic of 
the bigot, by contrast to the American who, in Myrdal’s terms, appreciates the 
conflict between conscience and prejudice.30 “Shame,” or the emotion that 
comes from this sense of conflict, is a “step toward emancipation from 
bigotry.”31 Conversely, the prejudiced person “is disposed to regard his 
hostilities as natural and as fully justified by virtue of the misbehavior of the 
minority groups whom he dislikes.”32 
Thus, countering the idea that remedial legislation must wait for education 
and social and cultural change to lay the groundwork, Allport and other social 
scientists argued that antidiscrimination law “often breaks into a vicious cycle 
so that a process of healing starts to occur.”33 Americans, Allport argued, 
might “squeal in protest” at such laws, but if such laws are “in line” with their 
conscience, they “are likely to be obeyed.”34 Thus, “[i]t is not entirely true that 
legislation must wait on education—at least not on complete and perfect 
education, for legislation itself is part of the educative process.”35 Moreover, 
Allport challenged the supposed primacy of folkways over stateways, 
observing that “[i]t was the Jim Crow laws in the south that in large part 
created folkways.”36 By contrast, a fair practices employment law “quickly 
creates new folkways in a factory or department store,” a result he attributed in 
part to the fact that such laws resolve a conflict between conscience and 
practice: “People need and want their consciences bolstered by law, and this is 
nowhere more true than in the area of group relations.”37 As I show in Part II, 
legislators and witnesses who supported the CRA made similar arguments 
about closing the gap between conscience and practice and made similar 
appeals to experience with existing antidiscrimination laws. 
 
valuations on various levels of consciousness and generality. The “American 
Dilemma,” . . . is the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations 
preserved on the general plane which we shall call the “American Creed,” where the 
American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian 
precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and 
group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual 
jealousies; considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice 
against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, 
impulses, and habits dominate his outlook. 
Id. (italics omitted). 
30 Allport & Kramer, supra note 28, at 35; see also Gordon W. Allport, The Bigot in Our 
Midst, COMMONWEAL, Oct. 6, 1944, at 582, 583 [hereinafter Allport, The Bigot in Our 
Midst] (offering an account of the “mental dynamics of bigotry”). 
31 Allport & Kramer, supra note 28, at 33. 
32 Id. at 39. 
33 ALLPORT, supra note 17, at 473. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 471. 
37 Id. 
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During World War II and in its aftermath, social scientists like Allport 
worried about dangerously high levels of prejudice, particularly anti-Semitic 
and “anti-Negro” sentiment.38 Thus, along with anti-Semitism abroad and at 
home, racial discrimination in the U.S.—particularly the persistence of 
segregation rationalized under “separate but equal” and of antimiscegenation 
laws—provided ready source material for the study of prejudice. In 1947, 
President Harry S. Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights issued its report, To 
Secure These Rights, proposing a robust civil rights agenda and an end to 
segregation.39 With Myrdal’s analysis of racism as its implicit frame, the 
Report identified the “gulf between our civil rights principles and our 
practices” and expressed belief that “the greatest hope for the future” was “the 
increasing awareness by more and more Americans” of that gulf.40 The Report 
indicted “separate but equal” and pointed to experiences with integration in the 
military and (to a lesser degree) in housing and employment to insist that the 
doctrine “has institutionalized segregation and kept groups apart despite 
indisputable evidence that normal contacts among these groups tend to 
promote social harmony.”41 In 1948, President Truman delivered to Congress a 
ten-point plan based on the Report’s recommendations, but he correctly 
perceived the measures would be received “coldly” and would not pass.42 
However, that same year, the California Supreme Court, in Perez v. Lippold,43 
struck down California’s antimiscegenation law, a momentous decision that 
“jump-started the post-World War II campaign to eliminate the laws once and 
for all,”44 and, in Shelly v. Kraemer,45 the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
judicial enforcement of a private covenant to discriminate racially in housing 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Allport, for example, published The 
Nature of Prejudice before the Court struck down “separate but equal” in 
education in Brown v. Board of Education,46 and as Congress considered new 
civil rights legislation to broaden the World War II-era FEPC (adopted by 
Executive Order).47 
 
38 Allport, The Bigot in Our Midst, supra note 30, at 583. 
39 TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF HARRY S. TRUMAN’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, at iv (Steven F. Lawson ed., 2004). 
40 Id. at 59. On Myrdal’s analysis of the role of conscience as infusing the Report, see id. 
at 22 (“Although the committee cited Myrdal only once in its final report, the document [it] 
produced . . . was infused with his central assumptions.”).  
41 Id. at 117. 
42 Id. at 33. 
43 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
44 PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF 
RACE IN AMERICA 206 (2009). 
45 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
46 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
47 Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 27, 1941) (“There is established in the 
Office of Production Management a Committee on Fair Employment Practice, which shall 
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This historical background provides context for this Article’s consideration 
of the insistence, in legislative debates about the CRA, on bridging the gap 
between conscience and American founding ideals and social practice by 
passing a federal antidiscrimination law. That context is also relevant to this 
Article’s consideration of competing arguments made about whether Congress 
could or should “legislate morality.” Thus far, my research finds little reliance 
on expert opinion (such as that of social scientists studying prejudice) in 
arguments for the CRA, but instead appeals to “common sense” and 
“experience” under state and local antidiscrimination laws to insist that 
antidiscrimination laws can and do change behavior. Opponents of the CRA 
also appealed to “experience,” invoking prior unsuccessful federal efforts to 
“legislate morality”48 (such as Prohibition) and insisting that a federal civil 
rights law would wrongly thrust the federal government into a problem that 
state and local governments knew better how to address. 
I. CONGRESS CAN AND MUST “LEGISLATE MORALITY” 
In this section, I identify several strands of argument made by supporters of 
the CRA with respect to legislating morality: (1) conscience and morality 
demand passage of the CRA; (2) ample precedent exists for Congress passing 
legislation to address moral issues; (3) while legislation cannot do everything, 
such as change hearts and minds or prejudicial attitudes, it can at least regulate 
behavior and prohibit wrongdoing; (4) experience with other 
antidiscrimination laws and common sense indicate that such laws can bring 
about change that may even, eventually, extend to attitudes;49 and (5) rather 
than forcing choice in social relations, the law preserves freedom of choice in 
areas of social relations. 
 
consist of a chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President.”). The life 
of the Committee would later be extended by executive order following World War II. See 
Exec. Order No. 9664, 10 Fed. Reg. 15301 (Dec. 22, 1945) (“The duties and responsibilities 
imposed upon the Committee on Fair Employment Practice by Executive Order 8802 . . . 
shall be continued thereunder.”). Although President Truman proposed an extension of the 
FEPC, the FEPC’s work came to an end in June 1946, when Congress failed to appropriate 
funding for it. TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 39, at 96. 
48 Arguments about private property and freedom of association featured prominently in 
oppositions to the CRA, particularly the public accommodations provisions, as my co-
panelist Joseph Singer and others have discussed. I am not discussing those objections in 
this paper unless they arose in connection with discussion of legislating morality. In other 
work, I discuss how opponents of Title II invoked arguments about involuntary servitude, 
while some proponents countered that Title II would eliminate lingering badges of servitude 
and slavery. See Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, 
and the Legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 71 MD. L. REV. 83 (2011). 
49 Indeed, some proponents foresaw a day when attitudes were so changed and fairness 
so internalized that such a code would no longer be necessary. See infra text accompanying 
note 114 (remarks by Walter P. Reuther). 
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A. Conscience and Morality Demand Passage of the CRA 
Proponents of the CRA argued that Congress could and must “legislate 
morality” to close the gap between conscience and race relations in the United 
States. Myrdal’s identification of the “sharp conflict” between Americans’ 
prejudices and their “American Creed”50 and his argument that the problem 
was fundamentally a “moral” one51 find echoes in many statements in support 
of the CRA. Marking the gap between America’s “professed beliefs and our 
actual practices,” for example, New Jersey Senator Clifford P. Case stressed 
conscience in asserting: 
[M]ost Americans want the Congress to act to right a wrong that has 
persisted for too long. The hypocrisy in which all of us have had a part 
has had a corrosive effect on the national conscience. Discrimination is 
debasing, not just to those discriminated against but to those who 
discriminate.52 
Another New Jersey Senator, Harrison Williams, argued that Congress must 
address discrimination because “our morality is at stake.”53 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy insisted that racial discrimination in 
public accommodations is “morally offensive to us all” and that Title II stands 
on a “moral principle.”54 Kennedy invoked the scales of justice to argue that 
“the need for this country to live up to its ideals” clearly outweighed “the right 
of privately owned public service enterprises to insult large sections of their 
public by refusing to serve them, for no reason than the arbitrary and immoral 
logic of bigotry.”55 Given that such a right was “plainly a right to commit 
wrong,” “[s]urely, in the balancing, there can be no question on which side the 
scales must fall.”56 Kennedy stressed that discrimination in public 
accommodations requires “Negroes to suffer humiliation and deprivation that 
no white citizen would tolerate,” adding that it was no surprise that such 
discrimination “has been the source of more than 65 percent of the 1,580 civil 
 
50 See Allport & Kramer, supra note 28, at 33; see also MYRDAL, supra note 28, at xlix 
(referring to “ever-raging conflict”). 
51 MYRDAL, supra note 28, at xlix. 
52 Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 88th Cong. 619-20 (1963) (statement by Sen. Clifford P. Case, New Jersey). 
53 Civil Rights Commission: Hearings on S. 1117 and S. 1219 Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 64 (1963) (statement of 
Sen. Harrison A. Williams, New Jersey) (arguing that the U.S. Civil Rights Commission 
must continue to address discrimination against minorities’ voting rights).  
54 Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 as amended by Subcomm. No. 5 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2655 (1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y 
Gen. of the United States). 
55 Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 88th Cong. 22 (1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the 
United States).  
56 Id. 
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rights demonstrations that have taken place since May [1963].”57 In his recent 
book, The Civil Rights Revolution, Bruce Ackerman argues that supporters of 
the CRA identified “institutionalized humiliation” as “the heart of the problem 
of racism in America.”58 He points to key speeches by political leaders 
stressing that “‘monstrous humiliations’” was the “evil” that the public 
accommodation law would address, and “freedom from indignity” was the 
freedom the CRA would advance.59 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous Letter 
from a Birmingham Jail wrote of “being humiliated day in and day out by 
nagging signs reading ‘white’ and ‘colored’” and by the denial of goods and 
services.60 
 Legislators and witnesses (similar to the social scientists discussed in the 
Introduction) also argued that most Americans wanted to do the right thing, but 
needed the help of a strong national law. For example, Walter Reuther, 
President of the United Automobile Workers (“UAW”), testified: 
There is great good will in Americans in all parts of the country to do the 
right thing. The Deerfield prejudice of Illinois suburbia is just as evil as 
the Bull Connor prejudice of the South. Down deep in the hearts of most 
Americans there is the desire to do the right thing—but the right thing 
will not be possible in Chicago or Birmingham unless there are strong 
laws backed up by the Federal Government. 
Sweatshop employers a generation ago, and today, are a constant 
embarrassment to enlightened employers. Strong labor laws are 
welcomed by employers who want to do the right thing, and strong civil 
rights laws are welcomed by businessmen, labor unions, school boards, 
State officials, voting registrars, and others who want to do the right thing 
with respect to first-class citizenship for all Americans.61 
Another labor leader, Gus Tyler, Assistant President of the International 
Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, stressed how such a law would protect “the 
man who wants to do the right thing,” but who, without such a law, is “not free 
to follow his conscience, because he fears the competition of a man who is 
doing the wrong thing.”62 Tyler elaborated: “A body of legislation, especially 
 
57 Id. 
58 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 13 (2014). 
59 Id. at 136 (quoting speeches by Hubert Humphrey and arguing that they “deserve[] a 
central place in our understanding of the Second Reconstruction”). 
60 Martin Luther King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” ATLANTIC (Apr. 16, 2013, 
11:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/martin-luther-kings-letter-
from-birmingham-jail/274668/, archived at http://perma.cc/783D-89E8 (reprinting letter on 
fiftieth anniversary, April 16, 2013). 
61 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. N. 5 of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1939 (1963) (written testimony of Walter P. Reuther, 
President, United Automobile Workers). 
62 Id. at 2193 (statement of Gus Tyler, Assistant President, International Ladies’ Garment 
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when it rests on our avowed ideals, tends to liberate the man who wants to do 
the right thing so he can follow his conscience. A body of legislation doesn’t 
only check the wrongdoer: it frees the rightdoer. Here we have decades of 
experience.”63 
“[T]he American way to go about tackling a very difficult problem,” argued 
Dr. Duncan Howlett, Chairman of the District of Columbia Advisory 
Commission of the Civil Rights Commission, is “to arouse the conscience of 
people, to let them see what the problem is, to gather facts, to point the moral, 
to call for action.”64 Thus, in a hearing to consider whether to make the 
President’s Commission on Civil Rights a permanent agency, the executive 
director of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) attested to the 
importance of “information and education,” stating that the reports of the 
Commission have “pricked the conscience of the public and much has 
followed from that attention and that acceptance of the moral responsibility 
implicit in it.”65 
Some legislators who asserted that the nation’s “conscience” as well as “our 
sense of decency and human dignity demand that we try to eliminate 
discrimination due to race, color, [and] religion” emphasized that successfully 
eliminating discrimination would result in other countries looking to the U.S. 
for “having given substance to the dream of freedom and equality.”66 
During the oral argument before the Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States,67 a challenge brought by a motel operator to Title II, 
Justice Goldberg teased out the issue of conscience in pressing Solicitor 
General Archibald Cox when the latter argued that Title II was “addressed to a 
commercial problem of grave national significance.”68 When Goldberg asked, 
“Isn’t there [a] moral problem, also,” Cox answered that, although he would 
“emphasize repeatedly” the commercial problem that Title II addressed (given 




64 Civil Rights Commission: Hearings on S. 1117 and S. 1219 Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 260 (1963) (statement of 
Dr. Duncan Howlett, Chairman, D.C. Advisory Comm., Civil Rights Commission). 
65 Id. at 66-67 (statement of John de J. Pemberton, Jr., Executive Director, ACLU). 
66 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1861 (1963) (statement of Rep. James C. Healey, New 
York). On concern for the international reputation of the United States as a spur to national 
civil rights efforts, see MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE 
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).  
67 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
68 Excerpts from Rights Cases Argument, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1964, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/10/06/excerpts-from-rights-cases-argument.html?_r=1, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HND5-XZ3J. 
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promise that “all men are created equal.”69 He added: “The failure to keep that 
promise lay heavy on the conscience of the entire nation, North as well as 
South, East as well as West.”70 
B. Congress Can “Legislate Morality” and There Is Ample Precedent for 
Doing So 
Lawmakers and witnesses also argued that, whether or not the civil rights 
bill would be “legislating morality,” ample precedent existed for Congress to 
“require by law what is demanded by morality.”71 Missouri Senator Edward 
Long observed: 
Most of our criminal laws are fundamentally moral. The minimum wage 
law, the child labor law, and many others are founded in morality. The 
civil rights legislation before us today seeks to do no more. . . . It merely 
seeks ways and means to help make the guarantees of our Constitution, 
the law of the land, a reality for all Americans.72 
Similarly, Representative William M. McCulloch enumerated many 
examples where “Congress has enacted legislation on social and moral 
grounds”: “[k]idnapping, child labor, prostitution, gambling, abuse of migrant 
labor, slave labor, adulterated food and drugs, mislabeling, and many other 
unacceptable activities have been legally proscribed by Congress.”73 Murray 
A. Gordon, of the American Jewish Congress, testified: 
I think it is also too late in the day for anyone to argue seriously that this 
type of legislation is undesirable because you cannot legislate morality. 
That is an argument that one finds wherever important social legislation is 
developed. . . . But we have had such legislation now for almost 20 
years.74 
Witnesses and lawmakers, as these examples demonstrate, countered the 
“legislating morality” objection by pointing to the success of prior legislation 
aimed at moral harms. When the Supreme Court, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
upheld Title II against constitutional challenge, the Court observed that 
Congress had often regulated commerce to reach activities that are “moral 




71 Civil Rights–The President’s Program, 1963: Hearing on S. 1731 and S. 1750 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 20-21 (1963) (statement of Sen. Edward V. 
Long, Missouri). 
72 Id. at 21. 
73 Additional Views on H.R. 7152 of Hon. William M. McCulloch, H.R. REP. NO. 88-
914, pt. 2, at 8 (1963).  
74 Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearings on H.R. 405, 2999, 4031 and Similar Bills 
Before the H. General Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th 
Cong. 124 (1963) (statement of Murray A. Gordon, the American Jewish Congress). 
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slave traffic).75 The Court stressed that the “fact” that Congress was 
“legislating against moral wrongs” in many prior laws regulating commerce 
did not “render[] its enactments” any “less valid.”76 It is beyond the scope of 
this Article to revisit the strategic choice made by the Kennedy and Johnson 
Administrations and supporters of the CRA, in light of the lesson of the Civil 
Rights Cases,77 to emphasize Congress’s Commerce Clause power more than 
the Fourteenth Amendment as the constitutional underpinning for the CRA.78 
The salient point here is that legislative debate showed an acute consciousness 
of the need to right a moral wrong and the propriety of Congress passing 
legislation to do so. 
C. Realism About What Civil Rights Legislation Can Achieve: Changing 
Behavior, if Not Hearts and Minds 
While proponents of the CRA appealed to the nation’s conscience and 
insisted that an urgent moral problem necessitated civil rights legislation, they 
also recognized the limits of what such a law could do. Prominent civil rights 
movement leaders and legislators called for such realism: the law could reach 
behavior; it might or might not transform underlying attitudes. For example, 
New Jersey Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. stated: 
As Martin Luther King said: “Morality cannot be legislated; but behavior 
can be regulated. The law may not change the heart, but it can restrain the 
heartless.” We have seen this in so many areas where we know we can’t 
change the heart of man, the mind of man, but we can regulate his 
behavior.79 
Reverend Richard Allen Hilderbrand, President of the New York City 
Branch of the NAACP, testified: “This is not going to be any cure-all. I realize 
that, but it is going to be a cure-some.”80 He elaborated: “[T]here is some 
pressure that can be exerted and . . . with the presence of the law, whether a 
person wants to do right or not, if he is prohibited from doing wrong by the 
power of the law, he is not going to flout it to the extent that he does now.”81 
Testifying in a hearing about the public accommodations bill, Roy Wilkins, 
Executive Secretary of the NAACP, distinguished between reaching conduct 
 
75 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). 
76 Id. 
77 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
78 See generally RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: 
THE HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES (2001). 
79 Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 88th Cong. 652 (1963) (statement of Sen. Williams).  
80 See Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearings on H.R. 405, 2999, 4031 and Similar 
Bills Before the H. Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th 
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versus reaching hearts and minds: “We have seen this in so many areas where 
we know we can’t change the heart of man, the mind of man, but we can 
regulate his behavior. We have done it in the Armed Forces, and we have done 
it in many other areas.”82 Wilkins’s testimony also appeals to past experience 
with the success of prior civil rights measures—a theme to which I return 
below. 
Despite the limits of using legislation to rectify a moral problem, proponents 
insisted that it was necessary to try to do so because proponents are “on the 
side of the angels,” however limited the effect of the legislation might be.83 
Others agreed that legislation “can help although it cannot do everything.”84 
Instead, “[r]eliance must be had in the ultimate analysis on individuals, their 
civic pride. You have to appeal to their morality. The people must do that 
which they feel is righteous.”85 
For example, Representative McCulloch, an author of the CRA and the 
ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Committee, stressed the difficulty 
of legislating in the field of “morals and the thinking and attitudes of human 
beings,” stating that any such legislation is “only a persuasion and a proper 
urging.”86 He added: “I hope no one [will] get the opinion that this legislation 
would solve this most troublesome domestic problem facing this country, and 
it won’t.”87 
As these examples illustrate, proponents of the CRA acknowledged the 
difficulty of legislating morality, but they insisted upon the necessity of using 
law to bridge the gap between conscience and social practice. They 
distinguished the immediate, pragmatic goal of regulating and changing 
behavior and the longer-term goal of changing hearts and minds. Thus, 
Michigan Senator Philip A. Hart asserted that, while you cannot legislate 
morality, a civil rights law that applies to everyone will mean society will “get 
used to the idea and become accustomed to it, we will learn to live with it.”88 
 
82 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 88th Cong. 656 (1963) (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, 
NAACP).  
83 See Civil Rights: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong. 
252 (1964) (statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch, Ohio).  
84 Id. at 184 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler, New York).  
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 246 (1964) (statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch, Ohio); id. at 207-08. 
President Kennedy said of McCulloch’s support for the CRA, “Without him it can’t be 
done.” See Advocate for Civil Rights, WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH, 
http://www.williammcculloch.org/advocate.html, archived at http://perma.cc/R5EX-NP9J 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
87 Civil Rights: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong. 246-47 
(1964) (statement of Rep. McCulloch).  
88 Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 88th Cong. 183 (1963) (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart, Michigan).  
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He elaborated: “[Y]ou can learn from a law that requires you to expose 
yourself to something which you think you will find disagreeable.”89 
D. The Appeal to Experience and Common Sense: What Law Can Do 
Many legislators and witnesses also pointed to “experience” to show that 
when laws prohibit discriminatory conduct, behavior changes, and sometimes 
attitudes also change. The testimony on this point parallels the rejoinder by 
Allport and other social scientists to the proposition that “stateways cannot 
change folkways” and that law will only succeed after social and cultural 
change. For example, Richard Bennett, Chairman, Community Relations 
Division, American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia, pointed to 
experience with other antidiscrimination laws to stress the impact of regulating 
behavior on eventual attitudinal change: 
People say you cannot legislate morality. However, laws do control 
behavior and uphold rights. In the process of acting without 
discrimination, people’s attitudes change. Further, experience has shown 
the difference between how people say they will act in advance of some 
proposed change in hiring or housing or school patterns and what they 
actually do-when the change comes. Anticipated overt actions do not in 
most cases materialize.90 
Bennett offers no citation for this appeal to experience, but his statement is 
similar to Allport’s discussion about the difference between people’s 
anticipated reaction to a changing policy to end discrimination and what they 
actually do.91 Allport described experience with state and local equivalents of 
the federal FEPC, observing that, “if employers and customers are asked in 
advance, they often give verbal objections to working with, or being served by, 
certain minority group members. But it turns out that when equality is 
practiced, there is little objection.”92 Indeed, experiments indicate that often 
“there is not even any awareness that change has taken place.”93 
Allport concludes that experience with new antidiscrimination laws has 
brought a “new insight” about the handling of prejudice: “It turns out that few 
employers are confirmed in their prejudices; they are merely following what 
they assume to be accepted folkways. They are cooperative when they are 
 
89 Id. at 184. 
90 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1985-86 (1963) (statement of Richard Bennett, 
Chairman, Community Relations Division, American Friends Service Committee, 
Philadelphia, PA).  
91 ALLPORT, supra note 17, at 466-67. 
92 Id. at 466. 
93 Id. at 466-67 (describing an experiment conducted in large department store in New 
York where “a Negro and white clerk worked side by side”). 
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assured that customers, employees, and the law prefer, or at least expect, a 
condition of no discrimination to prevail.”94 
The Senate Report on Title II, the public accommodations bill, also noted 
this dynamic and the gap between predictions of resistance and actual 
experience once the law passes: 
It is, moreover, clear that where desegregation in public establishments 
has been achieved either by community biracial efforts or legislation or 
ordinance, it has been done without the adverse economic results that had 
been forecast by its opponents. Richard Marshall, an attorney of El Paso, 
Tex., advised the committee by letter of the actual experience in his city 
with a public accommodations statute similar to S. 1732. . . .  
Many of the theaters and restaurants welcomed with relief the passage 
of the ordinance, since they had the force of law behind their natural 
desire to serve all patrons without causing arguments on their business 
premises. I do not think that even the most fervent 1962 opponents of 
the ordinance among the restaurants and hotel people would today be 
able to state that this legislation had either harmed their business, taken 
any of their property or profits from them, deprived them of any of 
their liberties, or created any super police power in the community.95 
As economic historian Gavin Wright has detailed, by the 1960s, “most laws 
requiring segregation had been repealed,” so that it was the fear of loss of 
business and white customers that “was repeatedly expressed” in resistance to 
integration and the persistence of discriminatory folkways.96 Wright’s study of 
the actual effects of the CRA finds a similar dynamic to that identified in the 
Senate Report, in which feared economic ruin failed to materialize and 
integration proved to be beneficial for businesses.97 
For many proponents of the CRA, successful experience with state FEPCs 
and public accommodations laws provided reason to predict a federal law 
would succeed. For example, New York Senator Jacob K. Javits asserted: “We 
have the valuable precedents of the many States and individual businesses 
having had experience” with FEPCs, “including, with the Supreme Court 
decision in the Airplane case that a State FEPC law applies even to interstate 
commerce, industry in interstate commerce, and I think the situation has 
mounted to the point where, in a social sense, we are ready for a Federal 
FEPC.”98 
 
94 Id. at 466. 
95 S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 21-22 (1964).  
96 See GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 76-77 (2013). 
97 Wright argues that the CRA brought about a process of “collective coevolutionary 
learning” as businesses learned that white customer reaction was not as severe as feared, and 
white customers learned desegregation was “not as bad as they had feared.” Id. at 101. 
98 See Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
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Experience with FEPC legislation also featured in rejoinders to the 
argument that Congress could not legislate morality. For example, James 
Farmer, National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality (“CORE”), 
testified about the fact that, while about half the states had laws banning 
employment discrimination, more than half did not.99 He elaborated: “There is 
also a notion about our not being able to legislate morality and therefore we 
should not try to have an FEPC that springs from the view that the employer 
has the right to choose his employees also.”100 Farmer countered that while “an 
employer like any other American does have a legal right to his prejudices,” 
that right must be must be cabined where “those prejudices [are allowed] to 
[en]danger other citizens or to [en]danger the Nation.”101 Farmer offered vivid 
analogies to drive home the rightful role of law in limiting the ability to act on 
prejudice: 
I have a right to dislike a man, I have a right to hate him, legally; perhaps 
morally I don’t. I have a legal right even to wish him dead, but I don’t 
have a legal right to kill him. The State then steps in and says, “This you 
must not do,” so an employer if providing jobs in the job market does not 
have a right to allow whatever prejudices he may have to keep other 
American citizens from earning a living in keeping with their ability, their 
qualifications, and their training, so that business is not private property 
in the sense that a man’s home is. The businessman and the union both 
have a public responsibility. They are not only producing goods and 
services but they are also providing jobs in the job market.102 
Experience with state and municipal public accommodation laws also 
featured in support for the CRA and the many effects that antidiscrimination 
law could have on conduct and even attitudes. For example, Karl F. Rolvaag, 
Governor of Minnesota, pointed to experience with Minnesota’s public 
accommodation law to counter the argument that tourism and business would 
suffer if public accommodations were covered by a federal law: 
We have made our public accommodations law and the actions known 
throughout the country. And, as I pointed out, put this on the face of 
every roadmap that is published by the State of Minnesota, by our 
highway department: “Minnesota provides full and equal enjoyment of all 
places of public accommodation and amusement under statute 327.09 to 
all persons of every race, religion, and national origin.” It is well-known. 
 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 969 (1963) (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits, New 
York).  
99 See Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearing on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211, and S. 1937 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Emp’t and Manpower of the Comm. on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 88th Cong. 219-20 (1963) (statement of James Farmer, National Director, 
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We have had no problems with the general public acceptance. It has 
caused no problems as far as our tourist industry is concerned. It is 
thriving. It is healthy. And we feel it is a good public act. . . . Our tourist 
business this year is 100 percent up over what it was last year in most 
areas of our State.103 
Pennsylvania’s successful experience with its public accommodations law 
(which dated back to 1887) also featured as evidence that federal legislation 
could be successful.104 Thus, Pennsylvania Representative William S. 
Moorhead declared: “I think that the experience we have had in Pennsylvania 
shows that I am not proposing a racial Armageddon for my southern 
friends.”105 
Nelson A. Rockefeller similarly testified about New York’s “highly 
successful experience . . . in the application and administration” by its State 
commission for human rights of its public accommodations law.106 Rockefeller 
explained that the implementation process, similar to that for the employment 
discrimination law, was that, immediately following the passage of the law, the 
commission “initiated a statewide educational program” and “held a series of 
public meetings with leaders representing business, industry, the clergy, labor, 
and community organizations in all major cities and communities throughout 
the State.”107 Some witnesses testified that the passage of a state or local public 
accommodations law was, in itself, “educational . . . for many people who had 
discriminated before” because it “reflected a will of the community.”108 Other 
witnesses cautioned that merely passing an employment discrimination or 
public accommodations law would not be enough “to close the gap between 
the principle and practice of nondiscrimination.”109 Appealing to Michigan’s 
experience with its public accommodations law, Governor George Romney 
 
103 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 88th Cong. 1117-18 (1963) (statement of Hon. Karl F. Rolvaag, Governor of 
Minnesota).  
104 See Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1745 (1963) (statement of Mayor Joseph M. Barr, 
Pittsburgh, PA).  
105 Id. at 1750 (statement of Rep. William S. Moorhead, Pennsylvania). 
106 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 88th Cong. 1175-77 (1963) (statement of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, 
New York). 
107 Id. 
108 See Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1148 (1963) (statement of Edmond F. Rovner, Civic 
Affairs Director, International Union of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO). 
109 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 88th Cong. 1179 (1963) (statement of Gov. George Romney, Michigan). 
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stressed the importance of “firm enforcement” to back up the law.110 The 
Japanese-American Citizens League similarly testified about the critical need 
for effective enforcement once “the legal conduct is set down as the standard 
of the community;” it added that, “Our experience has taught us that once 
compliance becomes the accepted and automatic order, the tensions and 
questions of the transitional stage pass away.”111 
Some witnesses drew parallels (although not perfect analogies) between 
stages in the labor movement and in the civil rights movement with respect to 
the path toward adopting legislation. For example, Tyler sketched a trajectory 
from “unparalleled” violence to recognition of unions to a recognition of 
rights, bringing with it “growing respect and a growing sense of responsibility 
on both sides,” such that differences between labor and management could be 
“expressed in debate and adjudicated through peaceful settlement.”112 This 
path from violence to peaceful adjudication resonates with Robert Kennedy’s 
statement (quoting President Kennedy) that the civil rights bill would move the 
problem “out of the streets and into the courts.”113 
Some supporters of the CRA foresaw a day when federal civil rights law 
might not even be necessary, as people would have internalized its standards. 
In striking testimony, Walter P. Reuther, UAW President, called upon 
Congress to strengthen the civil rights bill under debate; he envisioned passage 
of a strengthened bill as a step toward a sunset for civil rights law, when 
Americans had so internalized the law’s ideals that the civil rights law itself 
would not be necessary: 
Someday there will be a Federal code of civil rights which will protect 
every American, from birth to death, against discrimination in voting, in 
housing, in education, in employment, in public accommodations. Such a 
legal code of racial security will be the fulfillment of the promise of our 
 
110 Id. 
111 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2529 (1963) (statement of the Japanese-American 
Citizens League).  
112 Id. at 1968-70 (1963) (statement of Gus Tyler, Assistant Pres. of the Int’l Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union).  
113 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 88th Cong. 22 (1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the 
United States). Specifically, President Kennedy warned that:  
We face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and as a people. It cannot be met by 
repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased demonstrations in the streets. It 
cannot be quieted by token moves or talk. It is time to act in the Congress, in your State 
and local legislative body and, above all, in all of our daily lives.  
President John F. Kennedy, Report to the American People on Civil Rights, JOHN F. 
KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM (June 11, 1963), 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/LH8F_0Mzv0e6Ro1yEm74Ng.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JFR6-3P53.  
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forefathers [in the Declaration of Independence] that all men are in fact 
equal beings. Someday, after this code has been accepted by all 
American, prejudice will end and the code will fall into disuse. Such a 
code of civil rights will have set a standard of conduct that will make fair 
practices in all walks of life not only a rule of conduct but a condition of 
mind and of heart.114 
For Reuther, the ideal trajectory would be from regulating conduct to 
providing an internal rule for hearts and minds.115 
E. Leaving Room for Choice in Social Relations 
In her contribution to this symposium, Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson 
details the various justifications offered for the “Mrs. Murphy exemptions” to 
the CRA, including associational rights, privacy, and simply political 
expediency.116 As Wilson observes, “everyone understood that the fictional 
Mrs. Murphy was a bigot,” who rejected would-be tenants solely due to 
race.117 As noted above, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy insisted that “the 
arbitrary and immoral logic of bigotry” underlying refusals of service by 
“privately owned public service enterprises” must yield to “the need for this 
country to live up to its ideals.”118 In hearings about the public 
accommodations law, Kennedy was asked “on what legal . . . and moral 
grounds” he justified the “Mrs. Murphy roominghouse exception.”119 He 
defended the exemption on the ground that, although the civil rights law was 
legislating morality, government was not “attempting to become involved in 
social relationships.”120 He elaborated that public accommodations law did not 
affect those “who own small rooming houses and live on the premises 
themselves and just have a few rooms to rent” because “it becomes virtually a 
social operation.”121 
 
114 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States before Subcomm. N. 5 of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1940 (1963) (written testimony of Walter P. Reuther, 
President, UAW). 
115 This idea of internalizing law is evocative of the passage in Deuteronomy that refers 
to the religious person having the law before their eyes and written in their hearts. See 
Deuteronomy 11:18 (King James) (“Therefore shall ye lay up these my words in 
your heart and in your soul, and bind them for a sign upon your hand, that they may be 
as frontlets between your eyes.”). 
116 Wilson, supra note 9, at 973. 
117 Id. 
118 See text accompanying notes 55-56.  
119 See Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 as Amended by Subcomm. No. 5 Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2700 (1963) (question by Mr. Poff).  
120 Id. at 2700 (1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
121 Id. 
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II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST “LEGISLATING MORALITY” THROUGH THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS LAW 
In this Part, I explicate several lines of argument that opponents of the CRA 
offered bearing on the issue of legislating morality and on the appeal to 
conscience to justify a federal civil rights law. First, opponents warned against 
trying to change human nature as well as laws of nature. Some appealed to 
God as a “segregationist” who separated the races. Second, they asserted that 
differences between the races were a reason not to force associations between 
them. At the same time, they rejected integration and warned of harms from 
inevitable race mixing. Much of this testimony reveals continuing opposition 
to Brown v. Board of Education, which held “separate but equal” in education 
was unconstitutional.122 Arguments about the impact of integration on children 
also indicate the appeal to parental prerogatives to preserve segregation. CRA 
opponents argued that the proper way to overcome prejudice was for racial 
minorities to build their own support network of businesses, schools and social 
institutions to change their social situation. Third, they invoked freedom of 
choice and association as well as rights of private property. Fourth, a different 
objection was that, to the extent discrimination was a problem, state and local 
governments knew better how to address it. Opponents pointed to Prohibition 
as a cautionary tale of a failed attempt by the federal government to legislate 
morality, leading to ineffective enforcement and returning the issue to the 
states. They drew different inferences than supporters of the CRA about the 
experience of localities and states with antidiscrimination laws. Fifth, they 
accused proponents of integration of being hypocrites who lived insulated and 
segregated lives but who were willing to force integration on poorer white 
Americans. 
A. Forced Integration Would Violate Natural Law and Nature and Lead to 
Harmful Mixing; Parallel Societal Structures Are the Better Path 
Opponents of the CRA contended that America would face drastic social 
consequences if Congress forced integration and forms of social mixing. Such 
attempts to achieve social change would fundamentally harm the societal 
structures of both black and white societies. Opponents appealed to the 
“natural law” and to racial difference. They also argued that the proper way to 
overcome prejudice was for racial minorities to build their own support 
network of businesses, schools, and social institutions to change their social 
situation. 
Opponents of the CRA attributed segregation to “natural law,” which, they 
claimed, underlies freedom of associations. Thus, North Carolina Senator Sam 
Ervin stated: 
 
122 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.”). 
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I think that people segregate themselves in society on the basis of race in 
obedience to a natural law which is that like people seek like people, and 
I think one of the most precious rights of all Americans, of all races, is the 
right to be allowed to select their own associates and associates for their 
immature children.123 
Ervin argued that the goal was not to force racial co-habitation, but instead 
to 
provide the opportunity for each American, Negro or white or oriental or 
any other kind, to have free access and free opportunity to move wherever 
his talents, his ability, his money, and his tastes will permit him to go, 
within the rights of other people to live their lives as they want to do 
so.124 
Some opposition to the CRA shows the continuing opposition to integration 
of public schools. J. C. Chambers, of the Los Angeles City Board of 
Education, argued for “providing the proper educational opportunities” for 
each racial group rather than “indiscriminate mixing of people.”125 Mississippi 
Governor Ross Barnett warned of the negative consequences of racial mixing: 
“Senator, frankly I don’t [think] they ought to integrate in the schools. They 
start dancing together, playing together, now and then intermarriage between 
the Negroes and the whites, and it has never worked in any country. It has 
always ended up in a mongrel race, if it is practiced long enough and 
extensively enough.”126 This fear of a mongrel race was a frequently repeated 
defense of antimiscegenation laws, including in the Virginia Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Naim v. Naim,127 an opinion later endorsed by reference by the 
Virginia Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia.128 
Opponents of the CRA entered into the Congressional record two pre-Brown 
court cases, which rooted segregation in education in “the white race” seeking 
to avoid the danger of jeopardizing the “purity” of each race due to racial 
 
123 See Civil Rights Commission: Hearings on S. 1117 and S. 1219 Before the Subcomm. 
on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 41-43 (1963) (statement 
of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, North Carolina).  
124 Id. 
125 See Racial Discrimination in Federally Assisted Educ. Programs: Hearing on H.R. 
7771 Before the Select Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th 
Cong. 45-55 (1963) (statement of J. C. Chambers, Member, Los Angeles City Board of 
Educ.).  
126 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 88th Cong. 394-96 (1963) (statement of Gov. Ross Barnett, Mississippi).  
127 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). 
128 147 S.E.2d 78, 82 (Va. 1966), rev’d, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (“Today, more than ten years 
since that decision was handed down by this court, a number of states still have 
miscegenation statutes and yet there has been no new decision reflecting adversely upon the 
validity of such statutes. We find no sound judicial reason, therefore, to depart from our 
holding in the Naim case.”). 
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intermixing and mingling and daily association, including “social intercourse 
and social equality.”129 Dr. Kuttner of Liberty Lobby asserted another problem 
with this mixing: when forced integration in schools occurs, there is “white 
resentment, the white parent feeling that his child is mixing with people who 
might reveal standards of behavior which are unacceptable perhaps by the 
white parents.”130 In this statement, dangerous mixing includes not only the 
threat to racial purity through intermarriage, but also the threat posed by 
different social or behavioral norms. On the first threat, Kuttner pointed to 
marriages by prominent “Negro leaders” to “white” wives both to suggest the 
harm that integration could have on “Negro society” and to warn of the desire 
of such minority leaders to marry across racial lines as a “sign of success” and 
“to mingle very intimately in white society.”131 
Some opponents of the CRA appealed to natural differences to support an 
idea of parallel, but equal societies, while others clearly linked difference with 
moral or other inferiority. Parallel social structures promote harmony, they 
argued; forced integration, the opposite. Thus, C. Maurice Weidemeyer, 
Delegate to the Maryland General Assembly, asserted: 
I do not think this country can survive integrated. Many great nations that 
started out with the same foundation of resources and the same human 
beings, with the same capabilities, have not progressed to that extent. 
Why? Because they started about the same time as this Nation, and they 
fostered integration.132 
Louisiana Representative Joe D. Waggonner argued that due to civil rights 
legislation, “[t]he races have been pitted against each other and Americans, 
Negro Americans and the white Americans as well, have been divided as a 
result of this agitation.”133 
A related idea was that parallel social structures are preferable and that any 
advancement in racial progress will come from self-improvement by racial 
minorities within their parallel structures. Thus, in addition to opposing 
integration, Weidemeyer also argued that minorities have the ability to correct 
 
129 See Civil Rights Commission: Hearings on S. 1117 and S. 1219 Before the Subcomm. 
on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 416-17 (1963) (reading 
into record Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) and Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 
(E.D. S.C. Charleston 1952) (reporting testimony that “the only practical way of conducting 
public education in South Carolina is with segregated schools”)).  
130 See Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1968-70 (1963) (statement of Dr. Kuttner, 
Representative of Liberty Lobby, Washington, D.C.). 
131 Id.  
132 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 88th Cong. 584 (1963) (statement of C. Maurice Weidemeyer, Delegate to 
the Maryland General Assembly).  
133 Id. at 1572 (statement of Rep. Joe D. Waggonner, Louisiana).  
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“injustices” by catering “to their own people.”134 Opposing the public 
accommodations law, he asserted: 
The privileges and accommodations which the proponents of this measure 
contend are denied to Negro citizens are not denied to them at all, because 
they have the same opportunity to go into business and to conduct a hotel 
or restaurant or other types of businesses, just as much as any other 
citizens who have previously done so.135 
Opponents testified that, if integration is forced, businesses will thus be 
deprived of their ability to “recognize a Greek for a Greek, and an Italian for 
an Italian and an Irishman for an Irishman.”136 Restauranteur John G. Vonetes 
elaborated: “When I meet a colored person, not in my business, when they 
come into my door, I shake. Whether that is a movement of conscience or 
something else, the excitement or anything, I am not in a position to say on this 
business of conscience. I say, I am sorry that we have to differentiate.”137 
The notion that forcing integration, rather than segregation, harmed African 
Americans by “brand[ing]” them as “inferior” was a theme in Governor 
Wallace’s testimony.138 Wallace attacked the Brown decision and its 
“message”: “I would like to say if I were a Negro I would resent the 1954 
decision of the Supreme Court because that decision, in effect said, ‘You are 
inferior, and you cannot get a good education and you cannot develop unless 
you mix with whites.’”139 Segregation, he insisted, far from being 
“synonymous with hatred,” was in the best interest of all parties.140 
B. God as Segregationist and Author of Race Differences 
Some opponents of the CRA appealed to God as a segregationist, thus 
giving a divine root for the law of nature that forced integration defied. For 
example, Samuel J. Setta, Chairman of the Referendum Committee of Easton, 
Maryland and a “motel owner and operator” of a typical “‘Mom and Pop’ 
operation,” contested the Attorney General’s emphasis on the “immorality of 
discrimination,” countering with the immorality of a law that would destroy 
businesses by compelling people to deal with “the Negro socially.”141 Setta 
contended that neither Christianity nor Judaism had been able “to integrate” 
and that the “30 states” in the United States that have antidiscrimination laws 
 
134 Id. at 563-64 (statement of C. Maurice Weidemeyer, Delegate to the Maryland 
General Assembly). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1079-80 (1963) (statement of John G. Vonetes, Restauranteur, Petersberg, VA).  
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 498 (statement of Gov. George C. Wallace, Alabama). 
139 Id.  
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 587 (1963) (statement of J. Setta, Chairman, Referendum Committee of Easton, 
Maryland). 
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are “just as segregated as the 20 that don’t.”142 He explained that human laws 
compelling race mixing defied the law of nature rooted in God’s plan for the 
races: 
You are bucking a law which was never enacted by any legislature when 
you pass a law like this, the law of nature. God himself was the greatest 
segregationist of all time as is evident when he placed the Caucasians in 
Europe, the black people in Africa, the yellow people in the Orient and so 
forth, and if God didn’t see fit to mix people who are we to try it?143 
This passage vividly illustrates what Fay Botham calls the White Southern 
Protestant theology of race, where Biblical stories like God scattering the 
people after they built the Tower of Babel served to justify racial 
segregation—and bans on interracial marriage.144 What is perhaps even more 
striking is that Setta goes on to find justification for segregation in the life of 
Jesus: 
Christ himself never lived an integrated life, and although He knew His 
life on earth would be a model for all mankind, when he chose His close 
associates, they were all white. This doesn’t mean that He didn’t love all 
His creatures, but it does indicate that He didn’t think we had to have all 
this togetherness in order to go to heaven.145 
Setta concludes: “Gentlemen, we should give a lot of serious thought to 
these final remarks of mine and not try to outdo God in the makeup of the 
world.”146 
Another appeal to God as the author of racial difference was made by R. 
Carter Pittman, an attorney from Dalton, Georgia. One emphasis of his 
testimony was to establish the existence of race differences (including in brain 
size and IQ) that justified racial segregation.147 Pittman argued that the 
“specious propaganda that all men are created equal, and that there are not 
such differences between whites and Negroes as are significant for education 
and social purposes underlies the entire integration movement,” and was the 
“foundation” for Brown and for S. 1732 (the public accommodations bill).148 
Pittman insisted the question was one of “difference,” not of “inferiority or 
superiority,” for questions about inferiority or superiority made sense only with 
respect to specific purposes: “Certainly the Negro is a superior prizefighter and 
 
142 Id. at 589. 
143 Id. 
144 BOTHAM, supra note 12, at 148-57. 
145 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 88th Congress 590 (1963) (statement of J. Setta, Chairman, Referendum 
Committee of Easton, Maryland). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 893 (statement of R. Carter Pittman, Attorney, Dalton, Ga.).  
148 Id. at 911. 
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is superior in other ways because God made him different.”149 Pittman 
purported to illustrate with examples of “the same differences . . . throughout 
the animal kingdom,” concluding that: “We are going to have problems until 
the end of time, as Aristotle said, if you mix races. If you leave them apart 
there is no antagonism.”150 Pittman also blamed communist agitators for 
seeking to “bring about racial animosity in this country.”151 
A variant on the appeal to natural difference was that because of such 
differences, true equality is impossible and any civil rights legislation aimed at 
equality must fail. For example, Representative Waggonner argued that: 
[H]uman nature teaches me that there never has been any such thing as 
equality within any one race and there never has been and never will be 
equality between different races, regardless of the different amount of 
legislation that you might place upon the lawbooks of this land and at the 
lowest level or at the highest level. It simply cannot be done.152 
C. The Federal Government Fails When It Attempts to Legislate Morality 
As a threshold matter, opponents argued that it was not “the function of the 
Federal Government to regulate morality,” and it certainly did not have the 
power under the economic justification of the Commerce Clause.153 They also 
argued that the federal government’s attempt to legislate morality would be 
ineffectual because such laws attempted to change human nature. Opponents 
frequently cited the federal government’s unsuccessful attempt during 
Prohibition to restrict the use of alcohol. As discussed in the next section, they 
also argued that, to the extent racial prejudice and discrimination were 
problems, addressing them was best left to state and local governments. 
Opponents argued that legislating morality and moral principles were 
useless because human and individual choice are at the heart of eradicating 
racial discrimination. On this view, civil rights law will not be able to change 
human behavior. Thus, Louisiana Representative Gillis W. Long argued: “My 
people who have elected me to represent their views, say that they do not 
believe in this kind of law; they believe, as I do, that we cannot legislate 
morality or reason, and we cannot eliminate by injunction the conflicts of 
human nature.”154 
 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 912. Pittman asserts, for example, that he once unsuccessfully tried to “train a 
rabbit dog and a bird dog together” and “ruined them both,” because “[t]hey were different.” 
Id.  
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1572 (statement of Rep. Joe D. Waggonner, Louisiana).  
153 See Civil Rights—The President’s Program, 1963: Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1750 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 40 (1963) (statement of Sen. Sam J. 
Ervin, North Carolina).  
154 Civil Rights: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong. 563 
(1964) (statement of Rep. Gillis W. Long, Louisiana).  
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Opponents asserted that individuals must be able to make their own choices 
regarding morality without Congress imposing its own preferences. They 
challenged the propriety of Congress setting up a “nationwide standard which 
is, in large part, a standard of morality and human decency as to how the 
businessman must treat customers and prospective customers.”155 As attorney 
Laurence H. Eldredge elaborated this objection, people have a right to be 
“unreasonable and nasty”: 
I doubt that it is the function of law to impose such standards even where 
75 percent of the nation strongly approves of the standard and its 
imposition. Unless we come to a welfare state, the other 25 percent have 
the right to remain free to be unreasonable and nasty if they can withstand 
the community condemnation which results.156 
Notable in Eldredge’s argument is recognition of the possibility of social, or 
communal, rather than legal pressure as a possible avenue of change. Along 
those lines, James J. Kilpatrick, Editor of the Richmond News Leader (and 
influential architect of opposition to Brown),157 argued that Congress cannot 
change morality because: 
[Y]ou go about it through the churches; you go about it through 
persuasion, through the ordinary arts of human relations, and that this is 
how things are corrected, with an occasional nudge here and there from 
economic pressure. You correct it by a sense of shame.158 
By contrast to Kilpatrick, supporters of the CRA believed (like Allport and 
other social scientists) that the “shame” about the gap between the American 
Creed and actual practice was one reason that Americans would—ultimately—
embrace a strong civil rights law. 
Like proponents of the CRA, opponents recognized the limits of law in 
changing hearts and minds, but this, for them, was a reason to reject the law 
entirely. Thus, Jack Lowery, an attorney from Louisville, Kentucky asserted: 
The plain truth of the matter, as anyone knows who considers it, is that 
men cannot be forced to love and respect their fellow men by even the 
most stringent governmental edict. If moral changes could be effected so 
easily, let me assure this committee that I would be the first to applaud 
the enactment of such laws.159 
 
155 See Civil Rights—The President’s Program, 1963: Hearing on S. 1731 and S. 1750 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 235 (1963) (statement of Laurence H. 
Eldredge, lawyer).  
156 Id. 
157 See Garrett Epps, The Littlest Rebel: James J. Kilpatrick and the Second Civil War, 
10 CONST. COMM. 10 (1993). 
158 Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 88th Cong. 428 (1963) (statement of James J. Kilpatrick, Editor of the 
Richmond News Leader). 
159 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
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Lowery also pointed to racial “unrest” as evidence that “racial harmony cannot 
be achieved by governmental edict.”160 
Other opponents of S. 1732 stressed that legislating morality offended 
associational freedom. For example, “[i]t is not the proper function of 
Government to legislate for moral purposes” as it removes individuals’ 
“inherent right of self-determination of their associations.”161 South Carolina 
Representative Albert W. Watson argued that the public accommodations law 
has “exceedingly little to do with economics and is an outright attempt to 
legislate individual morality and private association. Of course, this is no field 
for the Federal Government.”162 
Some opponents countered the language of legislating morality by insisting 
that moral objections underlie attitudes toward African Americans. Thus, 
Samuel J. Setta, Chairman, Referendum Committee of Maryland, asserted: 
“The Negro people will gain acceptance when they meet certain standards of 
morality and living conditions. No law can accomplish this. This is the one 
objective the Negro will have to work for and earn himself.”163 
Opponents also countered assertions about the immorality of discrimination 
by stating that it is “just as immoral to enact laws which will legislate a man 
into bankruptcy or into a business relationship which will make his life a daily 
ordeal.”164 
Some opponents countered the idea that Congress was legislating based 
upon America’s conscience by refusing to “pass legislation on the basis of mob 
pressure.”165 
D. Addressing Discrimination Should Be Left to State and Local 
Governments 
Opponents argued that civil rights is not an issue about morality but the 
rights of state and local governments to address a distinctly local problem. 
Opponents testified that even though “[t]he President has said the racial 
 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2382-83 (1963) (statement of Jack Lowery, Esq.).  
160 Id. 
161 Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 88th Cong. 601 (1963) (statement of Edgar S. Kalb, Manager, Triton and 
Beverly Beaches, Maryland).  
162 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 1714 (1963) (statement of Rep. Albert W. Watson, South Carolina).  
163 Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 88th Cong. 587 (1963) (statement of Samuel J. Setta, Chairman, Referendum 
Committee of Maryland).  
164 Id. 
165 See Civil Rights: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong. 
581 (1964) (statement of Rep. Albert W. Watson, South Carolina).  
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dilemma which confronts us is not confined solely to the South,” the people of 
the South would most acutely “feel the effects of this bill, if passed.”166 
Opponents insisted that the “problem” in the South was “qualitatively 
different” than in the North.167 Representative Watson testified: “What 
happens to the innumerable establishments throughout the South such as public 
theaters, restaurants, and . . . fairs which will lose business as soon as 
integration occurs. . . . This will happen because the two races in the South 
(and in the northern cities) are separated by cultural and moral differences.”168 
This statement parallels earlier statements opposing school integration and 
other forms of mixing of white and black children because of supposed 
behavioral differences.169 
Opponents also argued that state and local rather than national solutions 
were the better path, since addressing racial problems at the local level would 
draw upon individualized knowledge. North Carolina Representative L. H. 
Fountain asserted: 
All over my home State of North Carolina and throughout America, 
responsible local people of both races who are closest to the problem and, 
therefore, know what can and in due time must be done, are solving the 
problem with a spirit and a will, with courage, conviction, conscience, 
and with commonsense and judgment that cannot be legislated.170 
Another North Carolina legislator, Representative Basil L. Whitner, 
similarly asserted: “[I]t has been a privilege for me to have participated in 
programs and efforts on the local level which contributed to better race 
relations and opportunities for our Negro friends.”171 He predicted, by contrast, 
that “the legislation before us would breed further discontent and friction, 
rather than to eliminate it.”172 South Carolina Representative William Jennings 
Bryan Dorn asserted: “It is past time that we begin to talk about what we have 
accomplished in the field of race relations in the United States and the fantastic 
progress that we have made. We have a better record in race relations than any 
other country in the world with a similar problem.”173 But he also asserted that 
 
166 See Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 1705 (1963) (statement of Rep. Albert W. Watson, South Carolina). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 1713-14. 
169 See supra text accompanying notes 130-131. 
170 See Civil Rights: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong. 
602 (1964) (statement of Rep. L. H. Fountain, North Carolina).  
171 Civil Rights: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong. 459 
(1964) (statement of Rep. Basil L. Whitner, North Carolina). 
172 Id. 
173 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 1596 (1963) (statement of Rep. William Jennings Bryan Dorn, South Carolina). 
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states were the vehicle of progress.174 Dorn contended that although there were 
repeated calls for a federal civil rights law to address lynching, none was 
passed; instead, “this crime was eliminated by the States, the local 
communities, and the people of this Union—completely eliminated.”175 This 
proved, he concluded, that “with legislation of this nature, it is best handled at 
the local and the State level.”176 
Opponents to the CRA who stressed that the problem of civil rights must be 
solved at the local and state levels appealed to federalism, claiming that the bill 
would result in an expansion of the Federal Government over the rights of the 
States without solving the problem. Illustrative is this statement by 
Representative Long: 
I am here to plead for recognition of a danger within this legislation of an 
unwarranted and alarming extension of the Federal Government into 
realms never before charted—of creating unenforceable laws that can 
only perpetuate bureaucracy and do little to solve the basic problems 
involved in the struggle over civil rights. This bill has been called an 
omnibus bill. I would prefer to call it omnivorous.177 
Because of the distinctly local knowledge required to address delicate social 
problems, opponents argued that the issues underlying the CRA are not about 
morality but instead are about ensuring the essential balance between State and 
Federal governments. 
South Carolina Representative Albert W. Watson expressed doubt that “the 
passage of a law here on the national level will solve this particular 
problem[;]” he contended: “I think that we are doing a disservice to those we 
purport to help, as we would lead them to believe that we can solve this very 
delicate racial problem with a wave of the magic, legislative wand.”178 
In arguing against Congress’s ability to regulate morality with respect to 
segregation, opponents of the CRA analogized it to the prior failure of national 
Prohibition laws, enacted “in years of hysteria about drinking.”179 Mississippi 
Representative William M. Colmer observed that, “we got everybody all 
stirred up and we passed a national prohibition law,” and then “turned around 
and repealed it,” because “we recognized that we could not legislate on the 
question of temperance.”180 South Carolina Representative W. J. Bryan Dorn 
 
174 Id. 
175 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1573-74 (1963) (Statement of Hon. W. J. Bryan Dorn, 
Rep., South Carolina). 
176 Id. 
177 See Civil Rights: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong. 
563 (1964) (statement of Rep. Gillis W. Long, Louisiana).  
178 Id. at 579 (statement of Rep. Albert W. Watson, South Carolina). 
179 Id. at 170 (statement of Rep. William M. Colmer, Mississippi).  
180 Id. 
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similarly asserted: “We had an unfortunate experience with prohibition which 
was a moral question. Finally, after a few years, it was decided that the Federal 
Government couldn’t handle it, and it must be returned to the States. This was 
done in 1933, and I think wisely so.”181 Opponents argued that, like 
Prohibition, attempts to legislate racial issues would also fail. Thus, 
Representative Colmer drew the parallel: 
You cannot legislate successfully in this field any more than you could in 
national prohibition that you opposed so much. You are attempting to tell 
people how they have to treat their fellow man in their social, economic, 
and other contacts with him. You know and I know and everybody in this 
room knows that you cannot do it that way.182 
W. Franklin Morrison, Executive Vice President, First Federal Savings & 
Loan Association, similarly asserted: “Now, any such legislation, which tries 
to legislate social progress, or force a situation, is liable to have the same fate 
as the prohibition amendment.”183 
Opponents also pointed to Prohibition as a “classic” cautionary tale of “an 
ill-fated effort on the part of the Federal Government to legislate morals,” 
which, led the federal government, “[a]fter a sad experience with Federal 
enforcement,” to “admit failure and return the problem to the States.”184 Thus 
for opponents, Prohibition served as proof that Congress should not attempt to 
regulate morality and instead the solutions to civil rights problems must be 
determined by local and state governments based upon individual and local 
experience. 
Opponents of the CRA also rejected the arguments made by supporters of 
the CRA that experience with state and local antidiscrimination laws was 
predictive of the success of a strong national law. Some opponents predicted 
that federal antidiscrimination laws in employment would be ineffectual based 
upon the experience of the ineffectiveness of various state FEPC laws, as 
evidenced by reports of how employers and employment agencies find ways to 
 
181 Civil Rights: Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of 
Persons within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1573-74 (1963) (statement of Hon. W. J. Bryan Dorn, 
Rep., South Carolina).  
182 See Civil Rights: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong. 
170 (1964) (statement of Rep. William M. Colmer, Mississippi). 
183 Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearings on H.R. 405, 2999, 4031 and Similar Bills 
Before the H. Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th Cong. 
308-09 (1963) (statement of W. Franklin Morrison, Executive Vice President, First Federal 
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work around them and violate the law.185 Why presume, they asked, that a 
federal FEPC would be any more effective? 
E. Proponents of Integration Are Hypocrites Who Live Insulated and 
Segregated Lives 
Finally, opponents of the proposed civil rights law characterized supporters 
of the law and of integration as hypocrites who lived insulated and segregated 
lives and sought to force integration on poor white people and the common 
man and his family. For example, R. Carter Pitman, an attorney from Dalton, 
Georgia, asserted: “Wealth and political power are great insulators. Race 
mixing in daily life is only for the poor. It is not for the hypocritical plutocrat. 
A show of race mixing is for the rich and powerful, but never the real thing.”186 
In particular, he attacked the exemption in the public accommodations bill as 
“a carefully devised rathole for those who spend their time preaching 
integration for the poor whites, while philosophizing about it over cocktails 
within the segregated shelters of exempt clubs.”187 He added: “It is improbable 
that any man who had anything to do with the preparation of this bill or who 
sponsors it now either lives in a 10-percent integrated neighborhood or sends 
his children to a school where Negro children constitute as much as 10 percent 
of the enrollment.”188 
CONCLUSION: PRESENT-DAY IMPLICATIONS OF THE “LEGISLATING 
MORALITY” DEBATE 
The aim of this Article was to examine arguments made that Congress 
could and should legislate morality by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and, in doing so, close the disturbing gap between American ideals and race 
relations in the United States. I have highlighted that proponents of the CRA 
appealed to conscience, predicting that people of good conscience would 
welcome a strong national law. I have suggested that these themes in the 
congressional debates over the CRA resonate with those found in the social 
science studies of prejudice in the post-World War II era, which built on 
 
185 See Nation’s Manpower: Hearings Relating to the Training and Utilization of the 
Manpower Resources of the Nation Before the S. Subcomm. on Emp’t and Manpower of the 
Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 88th Cong. 771, 772-773 (1963) (describing results of a 
telephone survey conducted in six cities, in February 1963, by teams of members of the 
American Jewish Congress. “The caller, without revealing his or her identity, asked whether 
the agency could provide a ‘white Protestant stenographer.’” The result of the survey found 
that many agencies accepted the order, and the various agencies likewise acknowledged that 
they were aware of the illegality of their actions).  
186 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 88th Cong. 901 (1963) (statement of R. Carter Pittman, attorney, Dalton, 
Georgia).  
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Myrdal’s identification of the sharp conflict between American ideals and 
prejudice.  
I have also looked at that social science literature to illustrate that social 
scientists took the problem of prejudice, and, particularly, of bigotry, seriously. 
They sought to understand the nature and dimensions of prejudice as well as 
what role law might play in reducing prejudice. They considered the role of 
conscience in triggering emotions like shame that could bring about a 
reduction in prejudice and discrimination. They considered the impact of social 
contact on terms of social equality on people’s attitudes. Discriminatory laws 
limited the possibility of such contact, while antidiscrimination laws could help 
create new “folkways” allowing such contact in different spheres of society. 
Again, there are interesting parallels in debates over the CRA. Legislators and 
witnesses appealed to practical experience with local and state 
antidiscrimination initiatives and predicted that a strong civil rights law could 
change behavior, if not hearts and minds, but might eventually change attitudes 
as well.  
Opponents of the CRA, I have shown, countered that Congress should not 
attempt to legislate morality and would fail if it did so. Far from viewing the 
CRA as bridging the gap between conscience and practice, they contended that 
the CRA enacted a controversial morality and that its agenda of “forcing” 
integration was contrary to nature, to God’s own design, and to social harmony 
and racial progress. It is worth stressing the appeal to natural law and divine 
law in this opposition, since, in present-day arguments about the proper scope 
of civil rights laws, those who seek religious conscience-based exemptions 
bristle at the notion that religiously-based resistance to racial integration is of 
any relevance to present-day controversies. Given the frequency with which 
the terms “bigot” and “bigotry” appear in present-day battles over civil rights 
and, particularly, the evident clash between religious liberty and marriage 
equality, a more complete study of that social science literature could be 
illuminating. Social scientists such as Allport studied the role of religion both 
in “making” and “unmaking” prejudice and pointed out that religious bigotry 
and prejudice, as a historical matter, have been more predominant than racial 
prejudice.189 Although some contend that the label of “bigot” serves as a 
conversation stopper in present-day discourse about religious liberty and 
antidiscrimination law, one could counter that discussions about conscience 
and bigotry sometimes treat the appeal to religion as a conversation stopper in 
the sense that any sincere belief must be accommodated and is wholly distinct 
from the bigoted views of the past. A more complete appreciation of the 
literature about prejudice would aid in making sense of these controversies and 
finding peaceful resolutions. These are topics I leave for future work. 
Finally, it would be fruitful to consider how earlier debates about civil 
rights law as appropriately or inappropriately “legislating morality” compare to 
 
189 See ALLPORT, supra note 17, at 444-57 (discussing relationship between religion and 
prejudice). 
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present-day understandings about the legal enforcement of morality. Robert F. 
Kennedy insisted that discrimination in public accommodations law, for 
example, was “morally offensive” and that the nation living up to its ideals 
through passing a public accommodations law overrode “the arbitrary and 
immoral logic of bigotry.”190 What do “moral” and “immoral” mean in that 
context? Is the CRA an example of Congress legislating political morality and 
expressing moral disapproval of discrimination? Is the Defense of Marriage 
Act (“DOMA”), by contrast, an example of legislating sexual morality and 
expressing moral disapproval of a sexual minority? Does that distinction make 
a constitutional difference after Romer v. Evans,191 Lawrence v. Texas,192 and 
United States v. Windsor?193 Arguably, Windsor addressed the legal 
enforcement of morality in two distinct ways. First, while Congress justified 
DOMA by furthering a moral conviction about heterosexuality and traditional 
marriage and signaling moral approval of homosexuality, Justice Kennedy read 
this as constitutionally impermissible disapproval of a class—same-sex 
couples lawfully married under state law.194 At the same time, in describing 
New York’s “evolving understanding of the meaning of equality” in 
marriage,195 leading it, after a “statewide deliberative process, to “correct” 
what they now perceived “to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or 
understood”196 by enacting the Marriage Equality Act, Justice Kennedy 
arguably is recounting moral progress in the sense or realization of important 
ideals of political morality.  
It is important not to avoid facile analogies between the enactment of the 
CRA and present-day struggles for LGBT rights. Nonetheless, the question of 
the different meanings of “legislating morality” is worth pursuing. The CRA, 
in prohibiting discrimination, attacked a moral evil and expressed moral 
values, commitments, and ideals. Contemporary antidiscrimination law also 
legislates morality in the sense of expressing moral values and 
commitments.197 Supporters of the CRA, similar to social scientists studying 
 
190 See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. 
191 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that an amendment to Colorado’s state constitution 
preventing state and local governments from creating protected statuses based on sexual 
orientation was subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
192 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and 
finding that sodomy laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment). 
193 On this question, see generally Linda C. McClain, From Romer v. Evans to United 
States v. Windsor, Law as a Vehicle for Moral Disapproval in Amendment 2 and the 
Defense of Marriage Act, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 351 (2013). 
194 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
195 Id. at 2692-93. 
196 Id. at 2689. 
197 On this point, see Chai Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 123, 130-135. 
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prejudice, predicted that a law that bridged the gap between conscience and 
practice would gain support, even if there was initial resistance. Today, in the 
context of LGBT rights, “conscience” more typically features in opposition to 
antidiscrimination laws that allegedly reach too far. On the other hand, the 
rapidly growing acceptance and approval of same-sex marriage suggests that, 
for some people, aligning law with “conscience” may be a reason for that shift.  
 
 
